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Abstract 
 
We examine the impact of conditional fiscal transfers on public employment across gender in India taking 
the case of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS). The 
MGNREGS, as an “employer of last resort” fiscal policy, is a direct employment transfer, which guarantees 
to provide 100 days of paid work opportunities at a predetermined wage for public works in India through a 
self-selection criterion. Using unit record data of the latest 68th round of NSS Employment-Unemployment 
survey, we examined gender differential impacts of MGNREGS on labour force participation rates across 
States in India. The unit of analysis in our paper is not ‘household’, but is one step ahead to capture the 
intra-household level of participating behaviour in the economic activity. The results, based on the survey 
enumerating 2,80,763 individuals in rural areas, revealed that there is a striking heterogeneity in the gender 
impacts of job guarantee programme across States of India. The probit estimates showed that MGNREGS 
job card holder’s labour force participation rates were higher than the non-card holders and the result was 
more pronounced for women. The analysis of the time-use patterns and the unpaid care economy statistics 
of job guarantee card holders obtained from the unit records also shows that augmenting public investment 
in care economy infrastructure is significant for the job guarantee programme to function at its full potential 
in India. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Globally, a direct employment transfer by Government - a job guarantee programme is an “employer of last 
resort” fiscal policy that envisions the government bearing a guarantee to provide paid work opportunities of 
predictable duration at a predetermined wage for public works. Many job guarantee programmes have been 
introduced over the years across countries, the most popular and largest in scale are the US New Deal 
programs, ex-post to 1929 Great Depression; the Jefes programme in Argentina and the Expanded Public 
Works Programme (EPWP 2004-05) in South Africa, other than the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) in India. These programmes are targeted at labour-intensive work 
in the field of environmental interventions and in providing public benefits in asset-creating public works.2  
 
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) of India was enacted by the Indian Parliament 
on September 5, 2005. This Act guaranteed 100 days of employment per year for individual households 
willing to do manual unskilled work at the statutory minimum wage. It was later renamed as Mahatma 
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) on 2nd February, 2006. MGNREGS 
is based on the principle of self-selection, and it is a step towards legal enforcement of the right to work, 
as an aspect of the fundamental right to live with dignity. This is one of the biggest centrally sponsored 
schemes (CSSs) of the Government of India in the form of direct fiscal transfers to rural local governments 
- routed through the State governments - for creation of public employment. This programme aims to 
redress the seasonal, cyclical and structural unemployment in the country by providing low-skilled poor 
work entitlement, thereby ensuring that when all else fails, the government acts as ‘employer of last resort’.  
 
It is important to highlight that the policy design of MGNREGS is not gender-blind. We will discuss these 
specific gender elements in the next section. Existing studies on MGNREGS highlighted that the 
involvement of women in wage employment has helped in breaking barriers for women by providing them  
with local employment, minimum wages and, safe and decent working conditions (Khera and Nayak 2009; 
Hazarika, 2009; Panda et al. 2010; Panda and Umdor, 2011, Narayan and Das, 2014a, 2014b). 
Specifically, the wage employment policy is one of the most crucial policies in empowering women as it 
strengthens intra-household bargaining power of women and also ensures better education and health 
entitlements for children (Agarwal, 1997; and Charusheela, 2003). Also, it was noted in these studies that 
though MGNREGS has improved, women’s participation at the aggregate level in India, its impact varied 
when one analyses data across States. However, the existing studies on MGNREGS do not analyse the 
impact of time-use patterns and the burden of care economy on the participation of women in public 
employment programmes. Against this backdrop, this paper examines the gender differential impact of 
MGNREGS on labour force participation across Indian States, incorporating the care economy variables. 
                                               
2 For details, refer Antonopoulos, Rania and Kijong Kim, 2011  
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It is important to note that MGNREGS is funded through a “direct fiscal transfer” from the Union 
Government to individual States of India.3 The total allocation under MGNREGS in 2017-18 (Budget 
Estimate) is Rs. 48,000 crores, the highest allocation ever for the programme to manage the pending dues 
and to tackle delayed payments to the workers. It is also to be noted that regardless of the Budget Estimate, 
as per the MGNREGS legislation, the Government needs to provide supplementary budgetary allocation 
for work to be provided on demand. 
 
The paper is organised in six sections. Section 2 reviews the related literature of determinants of labour 
force participation. Section 3 analyses the stylised facts related to MGNREGS including its financing 
pattern. Section 4 presents a descriptive analysis of State-wise MGNREGS and labour force participation 
rates. Section 4.1 introduces the care economy dynamics of the scheme along with the gender differentials 
in time-use. Section 5 deals with the econometric estimation of the effect of MGNREGS on female labour 
force participation, controlling for care economy variables using probit models. Section 6 presents the 
results. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2: Related Literature 
The empirical analysis of determinants of female labour force participation rates (FLFP) can be traced back 
to Goldin (1995) where he explored the U-shaped relationship between female labor supply and the level 
of economic development across countries. He interpreted the U-shape of the labour force participation 
as: when incomes rise, women’s labor force participation often falls initially, only to rise again when female 
education levels improve and consequently the value of women’s time in the labor market increases (Das, 
et al. 2015). Gaddis and Klasen (2014) also found a U-shape when they explored the effect of structural 
change on FLFP using sector-specific growth rates. The literature also examined the impact of female 
labour force participation on economic growth. Here is the growing literature on the economic implications 
of gender participation gaps (IMF, 2013, Teignier and Cuberes, 2012, 2014; Esteve-Volart, 2004; Bagues 
and Esteve-Volart, 2010; and Hsieh et al., 2013; Fontana and Wood, 2000; Aguiar, M. and Gopinath, G. 
2007; Dollar, D. and Gatti, R.1999; Acemoglu, D., Autor, D. H. and Lyle, D.S. 2004; Hendy and Zaki, 2010; 
Klasen and Lamanna 2008; Khera, 2016). The policy prescriptions of such studies including Agenor et al. 
(2015) was the effect of public policies (including public investment in infrastructure and efficiency of 
spending on health and education) on women’s labour force participation choices and economic growth. 
Their findings also highlighted that such policies raise female labor force participation rates, and depending 
on the relevant policies, economic growth could increase by between 1.5 and 2.4 percentage points per 
annum (Das et al., 2015). 
 
The theoretical framework often used in these models were Becker’s (1965) time allocation model, where 
                                               
3 India has a three-tier federal structure comprising Union Government, State Governments and the local governments. 
Local governments are sub-State entities in both rural and urban areas.  
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women’s labour supply decision is based on the trade-off between leisure and labour, and also based on 
substitution between market-time and non-market activities. These studies highlighted the significance of 
public policies in increasing female labour force participation on their productivity and in turn economic 
growth, as these policies increase the mobility of women from non-market to market economy. These 
studies also highlighted the significance of public policies like access to public infrastructure, care economy 
infrastructure, female education and reduction in gender wage gap in enhancing female labour force 
participation. However, there is no comprehensive study in the Indian context analysing the link between 
a public employment policy (job guarantee programme), time use in care economy and the female labour 
force participation in the market economy. 
 
Khera (2016) has succinctly presented the literature review on determinants of female labor force 
participation. She highlighted that lower education (skill) level of female relative to male workers; lower 
bargaining power in the wage bargaining process firm-based gender bias against females in formal 
employment, lower preference for working outside home in paid market-good production relative to staying 
at home, which corresponds to concerns regarding female safety and mobility in developing countries and 
higher preference for working in home-production relative to leisure, which is related to social norms and 
the lack of public provisions, including childcare support are the plausible factors which affect female labour 
force participation. It is against this backdrop that we try to examine whether MGNREGS designed to 
integrate gender concerns in the employment has translated into tangible outcome across Indian States. 
 
What we have attempted in this paper is not an empirical investigation of female labor participation rate as 
a function of logged per capita output, by Indian States, to examine whether a U-shape curve exists or not 
in the context of India. What we have attempted is to analyse the impact of a public employment guarantee 
policy - MGNREGS - in enhancing FLFP. A significant contribution of our work is that it examines the 
impacts of MGNREGS on female labour force participation, incorporating the care economy variables in 
the context of Indian States. Yet another significant departure from earlier studies on care economy is that 
the study uses a meticulously large Indian household survey dataset conducted by the National Sample 
Survey Organization (NSSO). 
 
3: Data and the Stylised Facts of MGNREGS 
The unit record data on MGNREGS related statistics is organized from the National Sample Survey (NSS) 
68th round on Employment and Unemployment for the period of July 2011-June 2012 - the latest 
employment data available in India.4 The survey was spread over 7,469 villages and 5,268 urban blocks 
covering 1,01,724 households (59,700 in rural areas and 42,024 in urban areas) and enumerating 4,56,999 
persons (2,80,763 in rural areas and 1,76,236 in urban areas). As per this survey, about 69 per cent of the 
                                               
4  for details, refer Ministry of Statistics & Programme Implementation, India - Employment and Unemployment, July 2011- June 
2012, NSS 68th Round,  
http://mail.mospi.gov.in/index.php/catalog/143 
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households in India belonged to rural areas and accounted for about 71 per cent of total population. About 
38 per cent of the rural households in India had MGNREG job card. Among rural persons of age 18 years 
and above registered in MGNREG job card, about 51 per cent worked and about 19 per cent sought but 
did not get MGNREG work. We will examine the State-wise patterns of MGNREGS in the next section. 
 
2.1: The Details of Unit Record Data 
As per the National Sample Survey definitions, individuals are classified into various activity categories on 
the basis of economic activities that they pursue during specific reference periods. Three reference periods 
are used in NSS surveys: (i) one year; (ii) one week; and (iii) each day of the reference week. The activity 
status determined on the basis of the reference period of one year is known as the usual activity status 
(US) of a person; that determined on the basis of a reference period of one week is known as the current 
weekly status (CWS) of the person; and the activity status determined on the basis of the engagement on 
each day during the reference week is known as the current daily status (CDS) of the person (Ministry of 
Statistics and Programme Implementation, 2014). 
 
A person under the usual activity status is classified as belonging to the labor force if he or she had been 
either working or looking for work during the longer part of the reference year. For a person already 
identified as belonging to the labor force, the usual activity status is further divided into usual principal 
activity status (UPS) and usual secondary activity status (UPSS). The activity status on which a person 
spent relatively longer time during the 365 days preceding the date of the survey is considered the usual 
principal activity status of the person. A person whose principal usual status is calculated on the basis of 
the major time criterion may have pursued some economic activity for 30 days or more during the reference 
period of 365 days preceding the date of survey (Das et al., 2015). The status in which such economic 
activity is pursued during the reference period of 365 days preceding the date of survey is the subsidiary 
economic activity status of the person. In case of multiple subsidiary economic activities, the major activity 
and status based on the relatively longer time spent criterion will be considered.5   
 
We have also utilized the MGNREGS portal of the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India for 
relevant gender differential data. To understand the working of the MGNREGS, NSS asked scheme-related 
questions at the household level and at the individual level. At the household level, it was asked whether 
the household obtained MGNREGS job cards. In case the answer to the above question was affirmative 
then the household was asked regarding the number of job cards issued to the household. The rationale 
behind asking these questions was to enquire about the inclusiveness of the scheme. The discrepancy 
                                               
5 The key ratios used by the employment and unemployment surveys of the quinquennial rounds of NSSO are the 
following. 
1.  Labour force participation rate (LFPR): LFPR is defined as the number of persons/ person-days in the labour force 
(which includes both the employed and unemployed) per 1000 persons /person-days. 
2. Unemployment Rate (UR): UR is defined as the number of persons/person-days unemployed per 1000 
persons/person-days in the labour force. 
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between the number of adult members and the number of job cards issued to the household was to provide 
an estimate of the level of participation in the scheme. It should also be noted that holding of job card does 
not guarantee that the household/individual has benefitted from the scheme. Therefore, the NSS asks 
additional questions to the household individual members - a) whether the individual was registered for the 
MGNREGS work? If yes, whether they worked under MGNREGS during the last 365 days? Three options 
for the question were: (i) worked, (ii) sought but did not get work and (iii) did not seek work. The following 
section interprets these data and arrive at the gender differential patterns of employment under MGNREGS 
across States in India. 
 
2.2: Interpreting data 
India’s female labour force participation rate (FLFP) of 33 per cent is well below the global average of 
around 50 percent and East Asia average of around 63 percent. An IMF paper published in 2015 noted 
that India is the second-most populous country in the world with an estimated 1.26 billion persons at the 
end of 2014, however a FLFP rate of 33 percent implies that only 125 million of the roughly 380 million 
working-age Indian females are seeking work or are currently employed (Census of India 2011). IMF paper 
also noted that India’s’ gender gap in participation (between males and females) is one of the widest among 
G-20 economies at 50 percent. Furthermore, female labor force participation has been on a declining trend 
in India, in contrast to most other regions, particularly since 2004-05 (Das et al., 2015). 
 
2.3: Public Financing of Job Guarantee Programme MGNREGS 
MGNREGS is fully funded by the Government of India in the form of directed specific-purpose transfers to 
the States. This scheme is implemented by the rural local governments in India. It is a demand-driven 
scheme. As specified in the Act, for the purpose of funding and implementation of MGNREGS, the Union’s 
obligation would ˙be to make payments of wages for unskilled manual workers under the scheme6, upto 
three-fourths of the material costs of the scheme including wages to skilled and semi- skilled workers and 
a certain percentage of the total cost of the schemes determined by the Union. The State government shall 
have to make payments of the cost of unemployment allowance. Apart from the mandatory provision of 
resources required for the implementation of the MGNREGS, its success in enhancing the “livelihood 
security” of rural households would critically depend on the effective implementation of the scheme. 
 
At the policy formulation stage itself, the Act was gender focused.7 The Act mandates that one-third of the 
job guarantee programme’s beneficiaries should be women. Two, it envisages a distance criteria that the 
work has to be done within the stipulated 5 kms from the residence of the job seeker, with preference to 
women and the aged. Three, it prescribes equal wages for men and women in public works programmes. 
Four, it envisages a ‘labour entitlement’ of 100 days to the members of the household (not one person in 
the ‘household’). This gives further space for women to participate in the programme. Five, a gender-aware 
                                               
6 For details, refer http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/writereaddata/Circulars/2058Notification_ wage_rate_2017-2018.pdf 
7 https://blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/economicsofpoverty/files/2015/12/Right-to-work.pdf 
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financial inclusion practice was emphasized in its operational guidelines, which recommended the local 
governments to facilitate opening of individual bank accounts for men and women instead of joint bank 
accounts for the wage payments. Six, it prescribed provisioning of care economy infrastructure at the 
worksites such as child care to enhance the work force participation of women. 
 
4: MGNREGS and Labour Force Participation Rate: A Descriptive Analysis 
Against this backdrop, the analysis in this section begins with the State-specific patterns in the MGNREGS 
participation rates across gender. This data is obtained from MGNREGS portal. Subsequently, we use unit 
record data provided by the NSS to examine the reasons behind such differentials across States in India. 
If we consider State-wise female labour force participation rate for the year 2016 in MGNREGS, it was 
more than 60 per cent only in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Goa and Rajasthan. In many States, the female labour 
participation rate could not even cross the minimum threshold of 33 per cent as mandated in the Act. The 
States with female labour force participation rate in MGNREGS lower than 33 per cent were Jammu & 
Kashmir (25 per cent), Uttar Pradesh (29 per cent), Arunachal Pradesh (31 per cent) and Nagaland (31 
per cent). 
 
There was no one-to-one correspondence between women’s participation in MGNREGS and the person 
days of employment as per household data on the MGNREGS portal for the same year. As evident from 
MGNREGS portal, the percentage of households completing 100 days of employment was less than 20 
per cent in all States except Tripura where it was 50 per cent. Further, the States which had higher person 
days per household had also higher percentage of households completing 100 days of employment. This 
showed that the scheme was working below its potential. 
 
Given the macro-picture from the MGNREGS portal, we use unit record data from the NSS’s 68th round 
on “Employment and Unemployment for the period of July 2011 - June 2012” - the latest employment data 
available for further analysis. The percentage of population having MGNREGS job card for males and 
females obtained from NSS data showed that at an all-India level, 71 per cent of men were registered with 
MGNREGS card whereas, registration was only 50 per cent for women. Lower registration of women for 
MGNREGS job card implies exclusion of a significant share of women in the first step itself. Registration 
of women was as low as 30 in States of Jharkhand, Meghalaya, Odisha, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Assam and 
Jammu Kashmir. 
 
It should also be noted that holding MGNREGS job card per se does not guarantee work under the scheme. 
An individual having the job-card might not have sought work under the scheme, or, an individual with the 
MGNREGS job card who sought work might not have been provided the work. The 68th rounds of NSS 
unit record data reveals that only 51 percent of those who had registered in MGNREGS had actually 
received MGNREGS works. The State-specific differentials showed that States such as Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Jammu and Kashmir and Bihar were at the bottom in terms of providing female employment 
under MGNREGS. 
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The NSS unit record data also shows that the percentage of MGNREGS job card holders ‘sought work, 
but did not get’ the job. This data is indicative of exclusion after registration in the scheme. At all India level, 
while 17 per cent of women registered under MGNREGS job card sought work but did not get, the 
corresponding figure for males was 20 per cent. It implies that exclusion of females was relatively less at 
this stage as compared to their male counterpart. However, as evident, there were State-wise variations. 
It has to be noted that States such as Goa, Manipur, Kerala, Meghalaya and Nagaland performed well on 
this front. Finally, at all India level, 33 per cent women did not seek any work whereas this figure was 29 
per cent for males. However, the State-wise analysis showed that women with job card who did not seek 
work were strikingly higher in Madhya Pradesh (68 per cent), Jammu and Kashmir (55 per cent), Odisha 
(40 per cent) and Gujarat (38 per cent). 
 
The unit record data analysis shows that LFPR is higher for MGNREGS job card holders than the non-card 
holders. While LFPR for men for MGNREGS card holders is 961 per 1000, it is 749 per 1000 for non-card 
holders. The LFPR for MGNREGA card holders was 697 per 1000 women, which was more than twice that 
of non-card holders (292). Furthermore, the unit record data revealed stark differences in unemployment 
rate between card holders and non-card holders; unemployment rate among non-card holders (39.92 per 
1000 males) was roughly eight times higher than that of MGNREGS card holders (4.59), its impact is more 
pronounced in the case of women, with unemployment rate of card holders at 2.89 per 1000 women 
compared to 30.85 for non-card holders. Thus, prima facie, MGNREGS can be an effective tool for 
improving employment status of rural women. 
 
4.1: Unpaid Care Economy Dynamics of MGNREGS and the Gender Differentials in Time Use 
The recent NSS 68th round on “employment and unemployment” has also incorporated codes on care 
economy activities (unpaid “economic activities” at the household and community levels)7 and asked 
questions related to willingness of women to go for regular employment under MGNREGS. The unit record 
data reveal that at the aggregate level, the time-use pattern of women in the care economy is not distinctly 
different among the three categories - women who worked (91.9 percent), women who sought but did not 
get work (93.2 per cent), and women who did not seek work (90.6 per cent). The NSS data also recorded 
the qualitative aspects of time budgets; for instance, when asked about the reasons for spending most of the 
time in care economy, majority of the rural women stated that “other members of the family were either not 
willing or not capable of carrying out household chores”. This, as a reason for being involved in domestic 
duties, is cited more by the women who worked (69.5 per cent) or sought to work (73.4 per cent) than by 
those who did not seek work (64.6 per cent). This emphasizes the need for care economy infrastructure to 
ease the dual work burden on women and to strengthen their participation in the market economy. 
 
The recent NSS survey also explored the reasons for why female MGNREGS job card holders pursued 
care economy activities intensively. The statistics showed that the percent was high for women who replied 
“it is by preference” under the category ‘sought but did not get work’ (52.1 per cent) when compared to 
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women who ‘worked’ (43.7 per cent) and women who ‘did not seek’ job (50.0 per cent). Yet another reason 
cited by them for intensively pursuing care economic activities was “non-availability of wage employment”. 
However, it was mostly cited by women who ‘worked’ under MGNREGA (27.4 per cent) than by women 
who ‘sought but did not get’ job (18.2 per cent) and by women who ‘did not seek’ job (14.3 per cent). 
 
The employment guarantee programmes not only directly influence the work status of women, but also 
impacts their ‘perception’ towards work. The unit records provided by the NSS reveal that the percentage 
of women who are ‘willing to work in spite of their domestic duties’ is the highest for women who ‘sought 
but did not get’ work (43.5 per cent) compared to the women who ‘worked’ (42.4 per cent) and women who 
‘did not seek’ work (33.2 per cent).  
 
The unit records also reveal the nature of work that is acceptable to women. The nature of work is 
categorized by the NSS into four categories, namely, a) regular full time, b) regular part time, c) occasional 
full time, and d) occasional part time. The unit record data analysis revealed that relatively larger proportion 
of women who have worked demand regular full-time work (26.7 per cent) compared to the other two 
categories. This finding highlights the fact that women “between the groups” who have worked under 
MGNREGA demand more dignified jobs compared to other groups. However, overall 67.6 percent of 
women “within the group” of women who worked revealed that they prefer ‘regular part time’ jobs. 
 
The NSS unit record data also provide wage statistics for men and women under MGNREGA and other 
public works. A large gender gap in wages can be easily observed for MGNREGA and non-MGNREGA 
workers. The daily wage/salary earnings of a regular waged/salaried employee of age 15-59 years was 
Rs. 298.96 in the rural areas and Rs. 449.65 in the urban areas. This was Rs. 322.28 for rural males, Rs. 
201.56 for rural females, Rs. 469.87 for urban males and Rs. 366.15 for urban females. The daily wage 
rate of casual labour of age 15-59 years, engaged in public works other than MGNREGS public works was 
Rs. 127.39 for rural males and Rs. 110.62 for rural females. Among the casual labourers of age 15-59 
years engaged in MGNREGS public works, the daily wage rate was Rs. 112.46 for rural males and Rs. 
101.97 for rural females. The daily wage rate of casual labour of age 15-59 years engaged in works other 
than public works was Rs. 149.32 for rural males, Rs. 103.28 for rural females, Rs. 182.04 for urban males 
and Rs. 110.62 for urban females. 
 
5: Econometric Estimation: Determinants of LFPR with MGNREGS 
Using the NSS 68th round data on Employment and Unemployment, we estimate the impact of participation 
in employment guarantee programme on women’s empowerment nebulously proxied by women labour 
force participation. In the empirical investigation, we ask the following questions: 
1. What are the determinants of female labor force participation in rural India? 
2. Is female labour force participation higher across Indian States with MGNREGS, the direct 
fiscal transfer? 
3. Do care economy variables matter for female labour force participation? 
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Econometrically, we examine the determinants of labour force participation rate (LFPR) using the probit 
model. Probit model is used because the dependent variable of our study is a binary variable. It is to be 
noted that the estimates of the study are confined to rural unit record data of national sample survey as 
MGNREGA is relevant for rural employment only. We used probit model as we have binary variable as 
dependent variable.  
 
The probit modelling is usually carried out in two steps. Heckman (1979) proposed a two-stage estimation 
procedure using the inverse Mills ratio to correct for the selection bias. In the first step, a regression for 
observing a positive outcome of the dependent variable is modelled with a probit model. Heckman (1979) 
procedure can be approached when there is a selection bias in the dependent variable. An estimate of the 
omitted variable would solve this problem. The inverse Mills ratio must be generated from the estimation 
of a probit model. The probit model assumes that the error term follows a standard normal distribution. The 
estimated parameters are used to calculate the inverse Mills ratio, which is then included as an additional 
explanatory variable in the OLS estimation. However, as we have not used wage data in the model, the 
Mills ratio transformation of the basic probit model is not undertaken. 
 
The basic probit model is as follows. 
 
Pr{L = 1} = α + β1MGNREGS + β2Xi + vi + ei 
 
Incorporating the care economy variables, the model would further expand as follows. 
 
Pr{L = 1} = α + β1MGNREGS + β2CE + β3Xi + vi + ei 
 
The expanded probit incorporating the control variables including religion, social group, marital status, level 
of education and MGNREGS job card is as follows. 
 
P r{L = 1} = α + β1REL + β2SOC + β3M AR + β4EDU + β5M GN REG + β6CE + vi + ei 
 
where, {L=1} if individual i is in the labor force,  
REL = Religion, 
SOC = Social group,  
MAR = Marital status, 
EDU = level of Education and,  
CE = Care Economy 
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6: Results 
Our findings suggest that MGNREGS has a positive impact on LFPR. LFPR is likely to be lower for those 
who are not registered in any MGNREGS job, for both females and males. Nonetheless, the result is more 
pronounced for females as indicated by the margin (it is -0.3266 for females whereas it is -0.1164 for 
males). It can be therefore deciphered that though MGNREGS provides employment opportunities for both 
men and women, women gain more than men from the job guarantee scheme. The result thus supports 
the hypothesis that MGNREGS engenders higher labour force participation. 
 
Further, we observe a negative association between the level of education and LFPR for females. LFPR 
is found to be lower for educated women compared to illiterate. There could be two possible reasons for 
the lower LFPR among educated women. Most of the work in the rural areas are available in either 
agriculture or under MGNREGS, and since work under both the categories are unskilled in nature, 
educated women do not prefer to work due to the nature of work. Therefore, the level of education has a 
negative impact on LFPR in the rural areas for females. 
 
The control variables that relate to religion and social group are also found to be major determinants of 
LFPR. While LFPR among Muslim women is likely to be lower than among Hindu women, LFPR is likely 
to be low for men of both Muslim, Hindu and other religions. Regarding marital status, we find contrasting 
results for males and females. While married men were more likely to be the part of labor force as compared 
to unmarried men, the same was not true for women (the probability of married men joining the labor force 
was 0.1629 higher than the unmarried men). Further, we also observe from Table 9.1 that the widowed 
(both men and women) are less likely to be in the labor force than the unmarried. However, LFPR for 
divorced/separated men and women is higher than that for the unmarried. It is also interesting to notice 
that the margin is much higher for females than the males (0.2262 for females against 0.0608 for males). 
 
Table 1: Regression Results for Determinants of LFPR (Probit Estimates). 
 Coefficients 
 Women Men Women Men 
Religion     
Islam -0.3041*** 
(0.0270) 
-0.0658* 
(0.0362) 
-0.1200 
(0.0104) 
-0.0086 
(0.0049) 
Others 0.0392 
(0.0250) 
-0.1277*** 
(0.0337) 
0.0156 
(0.0100) 
-0.0175 
(0.0049) 
Social group     
SC -0.1285*** 
(0.0244) 
-0.0490 
(0.0357) 
-0.0512 
(0.0097) 
-0.0061 
(0.0045) 
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 Coefficients 
 Women Men Women Men 
OBC -0.0982*** 
(0.0221) 
-0.0643** 
(0.0322) 
-0.0391 
(0.0088) 
-0.0081 
(0.0040) 
Others -0.1502*** 
(0.0258) 
-0.0920** 
(0.0374) 
-0.0598 
(0.0103) 
-0.0118 
(0.0048) 
Marital status     
Currently married 0.0130 
(0.0253) 
0.9200*** 
(0.0225) 
0.0052 
(0.0101) 
0.1629 
(0.0051) 
Widowed -0.2180*** 
(0.0331) 
-0.3280*** 
(0.0474) 
-0.0865 
(0.0131) 
-0.1045 
(0.0162) 
Divorced/separated 0.6054*** 
(0.0993) 
0.2398*** 
(0.1456) 
0.2262 
(0.0330) 
0.0608 
(0.0329) 
Level of education     
Below primary to 
Secondary 
-0.1093*** 
(0.0161) 
0.4738*** 
(0.0275) 
-0.0436 
(0.0064) 
0.0679 
(0.0045) 
Higher secondary or 
diploma/ certificate course 
-0.3057*** 
(0.0356) 
-0.1229*** 
(0.0340) 
-0.1211 
(0.0139) 
-0.0256 
(0.0072) 
Higher education 0.0694 
(0.0539) 
0.4551*** 
(0.0502) 
0.0275 
(0.0213) 
0.0661 
(0.0062) 
Registered in MGNREGA job card     
No -0.8430*** 
(0.0149) 
-0.7515*** 
(0.0222) 
-0.3266 
(0.0054) 
-0.1164 
(0.0038) 
Constant 0.6236 0.8771   
N  32821 33336   
 
Source: Authors’ Computations. (Basic Data) Centre for Statistical Organization (2013), NSS’s 68th 
round on “Employment and Unemployment for the period of July 2011-June 2012”. 
 
In Table 2, we have re-estimated the probit model of LFPR incorporating the care economy variables. We 
estimate separate regressions for men and women to capture gender differential determinants of LFPR. 
We have analysed the impact of MGNREGA on LFPR and, as expected, there is a positive association 
between MGNREGA and LFPR. The estimates revealed that the LFPR was likely to be lower for women 
who did not have MGNREGA job card. While for men, the probability of getting into labour force for non-
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job card holders of MGNREGA was lower by the margin of 0.1915 than the MGNREGA job card holders, 
the margin was 0.123 for men. It should also be kept in mind that the result is highly significant for women 
(at 1 per cent level of significance), it is not the case with men (at 10 per cent level of significance). As 
expected, the care economy variables have larger implications for women than the men. We can decipher 
from Table 2 that women who spend more time on care economy are less likely to be included in the 
labour force. It can also be noted from Table  2 that while controlling for care economy variables (codes 1-
10 refer to time spent on domestic duties, kitchen garden, household poultry, collection of fruit and fish, 
collection of fuel wood, husking paddy, preservation of meat and fish, preparing cow dung fuel, swinging, 
weaving and tailoring and tutoring), the variables related to religion become insignificant for women; 
however, it matters for men. Under the social group category, while controlling for care economy variables, 
the probability of getting into labour force for SC category is higher by 0.156 than the ST category for men. On 
the other hand, social group does not affect the LFPR among men. Apart from religion and social group, 
marital status also has an effect on LFPR. Like the earlier model, the level of education and LFPR are 
negatively related for women in this scenario as well after incorporating care economy variables. 
 
Table 2: Regression Results for Determinants of LFPR incorporating the Care Economy Variables 
(Probit estimates) 
 
 
 Coefficients Marginal effects 
 Women Men Women Men 
Religion     
Islam 
-0.0362 
(0.0355) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.0110 
(0.0107) 
 
Others 
0.0490 
(0.0396) 
1.2469** 
(0.5523) 
0.0154 
(0.0126) 
0.2589 
(0.1170) 
Social group     
SC 
0.1793*** 
(0.0370) 
0.6995 
(0.6062) 
0.0545 
(0.0111) 
0.1558 
(0.1483) 
OBC 
0.1580*** 
(0.0346) 
0.7016 
(0.5463) 
0.0476 
(0.0102) 
0.1564 
(0.1301) 
Others 
0.0825 
(0.0384) 
-0.0015 
(0.7355) 
0.0242 
(0.0112) 
-0.0002 
(0.1050) 
Marital status     
Currently married 
0.1874*** 
(0.0509) 
0.6656* 
(0.3710) 
0.0552 
(0.0140) 
0.1363 
(0.0688) 
Widowed 
-0.1412** 
(0.0701) 
-0.2232 
(0.5761) 
-0.0361 
(0.0180) 
-0.0247 
(0.0606) 
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 Coefficients Marginal effects 
 Women Men Women Men 
Divorced/ separated 
0.0549 
(0.1997) 
0.0000 
(0.000) 
0.0153 
(0.0569) 
. 
Level of education 
Below primary to secondary 
 
-0.1945*** 
(0.0237) 
 
0.0480 
(0.3473) 
 
-0.0607 
(0.0074) 
 
0.0102 
(0.0736) 
Higher secondary or 
diploma/ certificate course 
-0.3015*** 
(0.0621) 
 
-0.5181 
(0.5609) 
 
-0.0904 
(0.0169) 
 
-0.0783 
(0.0756) 
Higher education 
-0.3457*** 
(0.1031) 
0.0000 
(0.000) 
-0.1019 
(0.0265) 
. 
Registered in MGNREGA 
job card 
    
No 
-0.6039*** 
(0.0221) 
-0.6220* 
(0.3252) 
-0.1915 
(0.0070) 
-0.1233 
(0.0649) 
care economy code 1     
No 
0.3098*** 
(0.0328) 
0.5001 
(0.3646) 
0.1033 
(0.0117) 
0.1155 
(0.0948) 
care economy code 2     
No 
0.0246 
(0.0268) 
-0.0638 
(0.3746) 
0.0076 
(0.0082) 
-0.0126 
(0.0737) 
 care economy code 3     
No 
-0.4112*** 
(0.0266) 
-0.2141 
(0.3202) 
-0.1327 
(0.0089) 
-0.0430 
(0.0656) 
 care economy code 4     
No 
0.0912*** 
(0.0279) 
1.0567** 
(0.4495) 
0.0278 
(0.0084) 
0.1933 
(0.0777) 
 
care economy code 5 
    
No 
-0.2643*** 
(0.0256) 
-0.7090* 
(0.3638) 
-0.0808 
(0.0077) 
-0.1281 
(0.0591) 
 
care economy code 6 
    
Yes: commodities  acquired 
Otherwise 
-0.0588 
(0.0622) 
-0.0410 
(0.8672) 
-0.0167 
(0.0175) 
-0.0024 
(0.0497) 
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 Coefficients Marginal effects 
 Women Men Women Men 
No 
0.0986*** 
(0.0385) 
1.0261* 
(0.5398) 
0.0298 
(0.0113) 
0.1536 
(0.0564) 
 care economy code 7 
 
    
Yes: commodities  acquired 
Otherwise 
0.0525 
(0.0818) 
-0.0472 
(0.8551) 
0.0146 
(0.0226) 
-0.0102 
(0.1822) 
No 
0.1726** 
(0.0704) 
-0.1302 
(0.4789) 
0.0504 
(0.0192) 
-0.0268 
(0.1035) 
 
 care economy code 8 
    
No 
0.0332 
(0.0243) 
-0.3927 
(0.4289) 
0.0102 
(0.0075) 
-0.0904 
(0.1117) 
 
 care economy code 9 
    
No 
0.0344 
(0.0251) 
-1.0824** 
(0.4266) 
0.0106 
(0.0077) 
-0.2906 
(0.1367) 
 care economy code 10      
No 
-0.0365 
(0.0405) 
-0.0903 
(0.5660) 
-0.0114 
(0.0128) 
-0.0186 
(0.1217) 
Constant -0.4923 -1.6681   
 N 17645 159 17645 159 
 
Source: Authors’ Computations. (Basic Data) Centre for Statistical Organization (2013), NSS’s 68th round 
on “Employment and Unemployment for the period of July 2011-June 2012”. 
 
7: Conclusion 
The female labor force participation in India is lower than G20 countries. It declined between 1993-94 and 
2011-12 as per the NSS unit record data. The gender differentials in labour force participation are also very 
prominent in India. The paper analysed whether MGNREGS has helped to reduce the gender gaps in 
labour force participation in India. 
 
Using unit record data from the NSS employment and unemployment survey, we analysed the impact of 
MGNREGS - the job guarantee programme - on women’s labour force participation across States of India. 
The data on State-wise women’s participation rate revealed that gender differentials are strikingly different 
across States. While women’s participation rate in MGNREGS was more than 60 per cent in States like 
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Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Goa and Rajasthan, in States like Jammu & Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh, Arunachal 
Pradesh and Nagaland, the women’s participation rate did not even cross the minimum threshold of 33 per 
cent as mandated by the MGNREGS. 
 
The analysis also revealed that work force participation of MGNREGS job card holders were much higher 
than the non-card holders for both males and females. Moreover, the gap between the two was much more 
pronounced for females. Our findings also showed that the unemployment rate was much higher for the 
non-card holders than the MGNREGS job card holders. While the unemployment rate among the males 
for non-card holders was 8 times higher than the MGNREGS job card holders, it was more than 10 times 
for females. 
 
We also examined the determinants of labour force participation rate incorporating MGNREGS. The probit 
analysis showed that MGNREGS had a positive impact on LFPR for both males and females and the result 
was found to be more pronounced for women. However, gender differential impacts are strikingly different 
across States. 
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